# Lesson Plan – July 2nd

### Lesson Plan – explained

In this exercise, I will role-play as the 1N… And – in all instances – the neg ran a one-off Kritik.

You are aff… and you’ll need to do three things:

* Start by reading the Neg ev – with an eye on generating cx threads
* Prep a 90 second cx – some students shall be called upon.
* If you were limited to making four non-carded answers, jot down what those four would be.

Background info – your Aff was:

* Plan – increase CFIUS transparency… plan in not a QPQ, but is a concession.
* Protectionism Adv
* Rels adv – SCS, ECS, Warming.

### Example #1

#### The aff’s affect includes appeals to apocalyptic rhetoric. These prediction are forever inaccurate, but do ensure endless global presence in a futile attempt to exterminate the unknown

Masco 14 (Joseph Masco, professor of anthropology and the social sciences at the University of Chicago, PhD in anthropology from UC San Diego, November 2014, “Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror,” pp 1-21) gz

In the fall of 2001, the United States inaugurated a new project to secure the American future, and did so in the name, and language, of counterterror. The very real terrorist violence of September 2001 was quickly harnessed by U.S. officials to a conceptual project that mobilizes affects (fear, terror, anger) via imaginary processes (worry, precarity, threat) to constitute an unlimited space and time horizon for military state action. By amplifying official terror and public anxiety, the U.S. security apparatus powerfully remade itself in the early twenty-first century, proliferating experts, technological infrastructures, and global capacities in the name of existential defense. Counterterror constitutes itself today as endless, boundless, and defensive—a necessary means of protecting American interests in a world of emergent and violent dangers. The resulting security state apparatus no longer recognizes national boundaries or citizenship as the defining coordinates of its governance; rather, it constitutes a dangerous future as its object of concern. The motivating force behind this radical renewal and expansion of the national security state in the twenty-first century is a vision of a world without borders, generating threats without limit. The goal of the counterterror state is to produce and administer a U.S.-centric world, one in which American interests can never be surprised by external events, let alone shocked by them (see U.S. White House 2002a). Always already in crisis and failing, this aspirational image of American power has nonetheless been hugely productive in its first decade, generating new expert worlds devoted to counterterror as a planetary project while rewriting the domestic social contract in fundamental ways.

The relationship between affect, technological capacity, and political agency in U.S. national security culture is the central concern of this book, which investigates the conditions of possibility for the most powerful military state in human history to declare war on an emotion. In particular, it traces how the affective politics of the Cold War nuclear state both enabled, and—after 2001—were transformed into those of the counterterror state. Terror , as we shall see, has a specific genealogy in the United States after 1945, one that is deeply structured by the revolutionary effects of military technoscience on American society and governance. But existential terror (after 1945, of the atomic bomb; after 2001, of the WMD) not only empowers the most radical actions of the security state; it also creates ideological barriers to dealing with a vast set of everyday forms of suffering and vulnerability that Americans experience, now rejected in favor of warding off imagined catastrophes. The escalating violence of neoliberal economics in the twenty-first century (poverty, bankrupt municipal governments, spectacular white-collar crime, energy scarcity) and of an increasingly destabilized biosphere (affecting health, agriculture, city infrastructures) generate an intensifying experience of precarity in the United States but rarely rise to the level of a formal national security concern. Although cities lost to storm surges and bankruptcies create terrors of the most visceral and immediate kind for citizens, such events do not activate the attention of the counterterror state. 1 The state security apparatus today sets aside these everyday insecurities endured by citizens to pursue a specific, if expansive, universe of terroristic potentials. American insecurity may derive from many sources, but it can be affectively channeled to enable a state project with specific logics and coordinates. Put differently, the United States is a global hyperpower that increasingly produces the conditions for its own instability (politically, economically, environmentally) and then mobilizes the resulting vulnerability of its citizens and systems to demand an even greater investment in security infrastructures. Counterterror has thus become recursive and self-colonizing, replacing the social commitment to building a prosperous collective future and a stable international order with the project of warding off a field of imagined and emergent dangers.

Given the wide-ranging global violence (involving wars, covert operations, and drone strikes) as well as the extraordinary costs of counterterror, its incompatibility with democratic governance, and its overwhelmingly negative vision of citizens, international relations, and the future, it is important to consider how and why counterterror has become so American. What a national community fears and how it responds to those fears are cultural forms as well as technologically mediated processes, the basis for a domestic politics as well as a geopolitics. The affects and infrastructures of the contemporary security state, as we shall see, have both a history and an emerging logic and purpose. This book explores why American society, at the very height of its global military, economic, and cultural power, has been so receptive to a state program that offers little in the way of material everyday security in exchange for increasing public docility, private excitability, and the promise of unending war. The Theater of Operations is ultimately an examination of American self-fashioning through technoscience and threat projection, of how fear and terror have been domesticated as a primary national resource and projected out globally as a twenty-first-century American project.

Threatening Histories

One of the very first formal acts of the War on Terror was a purge of the U.S. national archives. After the suicide-hijacker attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, researchers at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, myself included, began to notice the disappearance of long-available files or the absence of documents within them, sometimes marked with a withdrawal notice stating that “this item was removed because access to it is restricted” (figure I .1; see Aid 2006; U.S. Information Security Oversight Office 2006). Specific historical materials related to national intelligence estimates, emergency response planning, nuclear policy, and covert actions dating back to World War I were pulled from public access and reclassified. Documents that had been in the public domain for years and, in some cases, already published in official government histories were nonetheless inexplicably recategorized as official secrets. Codified in secret legal agreements with U.S. intelligence and defense agencies, this reclassification program extended from the National Archives to the presidential library system, involving records from the State Department, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Department of Defense (DOD), as well as from agencies that no longer officially exist—such as the Atomic Energy Commission, Defense Nuclear Agency, and Chemical Warfare Service. Thus, before the United States invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 (which inaugurated the George W. Bush administration’s global War on Terror), or adopted the U.S.A. Patriot Act on October 26 (which profoundly redefined the concept of U.S. citizenship through search, seizure, surveillance, and detention policies), a war on public memory was already well under way.

We might well ask: Why would national security policy documents, particularly those of the long-dead Cold War, be of such immediate concern to U.S. officials, appearing to undermine the War on Terror at its very founding? And if American history began anew with the violence of September 2001, as White House officials reiterated over and over again in their public statements, declaring the end of Cold War security logics of deterrence and a “new normal” of preemptive counterterrorism, then why was it so important to control the deep history of the national security state?

We should begin by recognizing that the official declaration of a “new” counterterror state in 2001 was actually a repetition, modeled in language and tone on the launch of the national security state in 1947. Both projects involved the designation of new insecurities, new institutions to fight them, a public mobilization campaign grounded in fear, and above all, official claims that a new kind of war (a cold war or a war on terror) was a multigenerational commitment, constituting a new mode of everyday life rather than a brief intensity of conflict. The former cold warriors in the George W. Bush administration intended the War on Terror to be as powerful as the Cold War in realigning citizen-state relations and defining American geopolitical objectives, constituting a renewed commitment to state and nation building through confronting an existential danger. Nonetheless, official desires for a newly militarized consensus, and a reliance on a prior model of state and nation building, still do not explain the immediate anxiety about the public history of the national security state in the fall of 2001.

Consider the following two instances of War on Terror reclassification of Cold War materials. 2 A “top secret” memo from April 27, 1951 (originally declassified in 1996), on the subject of “Chinese Communist Intentions to Intervene in Korea” seems to have been reclassified because it documents a failure to predict the future. The CIA intelligence estimate states that the Chinese would not invade Korea in 1950, as they in fact did in November of that year (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951). It was pulled for reclassification on October 16, 2001. A CIA report to the National Security Council from April 1949 (originally declassified in 1996 and reclassified in 2005) on the subject of the “Atomic Energy Program of the USSR” also attempts to engage the future, stating that “in order to estimate the capability of the USSR to wage atomic warfare, it is necessary to know, not only the events that preceded the date when the first bomb is detonated, but also the capability for bomb production thereafter” (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1949, 1). It calls for a comprehensive effort to study Soviet capabilities in nuclear weapons science, including “special intelligence,” “interrogations,” “covert operations,” attention to “Soviet technical literatures,” as well as the production of a “detection system” to discover when a nuclear explosion has occurred (ibid.). The document suggests that in spring 1949 the CIA was unaware that the Soviets would test their first atomic bomb on August 29 of that year. Today, these documents show how the newly formed U.S. intelligence agencies of the mid-twentieth century calculated Communist activities and nuclear threat at the very start of the Cold War. However, the documents also reveal something else that is deeply important to national security professionals to this day: the value—and the shame—of strategic surprise.

In their historical moments, the shock of the first Soviet nuclear test and of the Communist revolution in China and later actions in Korea were driving forces for a massive expansion of the national security state in the 1950s, a radical investment in militarism not to be repeated until the first decade of the twenty-first century, when the nuclear security state, shocked by suicide-hijacker attacks on two American cities, remade itself under the logics of counterterror. The politics of shock are central to the conceptualization of the national security state as a distinctly American form of power. We might think of the reclassification project as not only a sign of the deep commitment of the counterterror state to official secrecy and covert action in all its forms, but also as an effort to purge evidence of the inability of the national security apparatus to perfectly predict the future—to anticipate and mediate crisis and thereby produce a normalized everyday, unbroken by trauma. It is as if the failure to prevent the suicide hijackers in 2001 created a reverberating anxiety not only about the attacks but also about the concept of national security itself, connecting seemingly disparate and historically distinct expert judgments within an alternative understanding of American power, an infrastructure of failure rather than success. The failure to predict global events, let alone protect U.S. citizens and cities from violence, haunts U.S. security culture today, creating the constant drive for new technical capacities and the increasing militarization of American life. It also generates professional desires for revenge against those who have revealed the institutional weakness of the global hyperpower. These administrative commitments fuse the problem of futures, infrastructures, expertise, and international competition with affect in a new way, one that creates the expectation of a total anticipatory control of the future even as that possibility breaks down from one second to the next, producing the grounds for serial shocks (and thus, perpetual trauma).

During the Cold War constituting, mobilizing, and exploiting existential danger was a central domain of national politics, with each federal election in part based on how prospective leaders would handle the production of nuclear technologies as well as manage the minute-to-minute threat of nuclear attack. Evoking existential threat became the core vehicle for building a military-industrial state, pursuing rivalries between political parties, and mobilizing ideological campaigns on both the Right and the Left. Nuclear fear was thus a total social formation in the second half of the twentieth century, mobilizing all aspects of American society through specific images of the end of the nation-state. This negative view of the future was balanced by investments in a welfare-state apparatus devoted to improving the conditions of everyday life for citizens in terms of health, education, and the environment (Light 2003). Thus, the catastrophic as well as the utopian potentials of the nuclear state were explicit terms of public discourse, making both panic and promise the basis for the domestic political sphere. Americans now live in a postwelfare state society, which is no longer so formally invested in improving the qualities of collective life through social programming; thus, terror has increasingly become the primary domain of everyday politics in the early twenty-first century. The lack of a positive vision of the collective future is pronounced in the United States today, and it is amplified by the increasingly blurred public memory of the historical evolution of the security state itself. Indeed, the proliferation of Cold War nuclear panics is rarely discussed as a model for contemporary counterterror politics, leaving largely unexamined the truth or falsity of official claims of Soviet nuclear advantage: the 1950s bomber gap, the 1960s missile gap, the 1970s window of vulnerability, and the 1980s Soviet first-strike capability. But it is important to recognize that these domestic productions, as iconic moments in American politics, were emotional recruitments before they were technological or military claims of fact. These episodes were domestic political campaigns of threat proliferation before, and sometimes even after, the technological and scientific reality of Soviet military capabilities had been determined. From this perspective, terror has a specific American logic and domestic history, one that since 1945 has drawn on the destructive capacities of nuclear weapons to focus social energies, unlock resources, and build things. In the twentieth century, the United States remade itself through the atomic bomb, using nuclear fear as a coordinating principle for U.S. institutions, citizen-state relations, and geopolitics alike (Masco 2006).

The counterterror state, like the countercommunist state before it, attempts to install through domestic affective recruitments a new perception of everyday life that is unassailable. The campaign to normalize threat is the flip side of identifying and articulating new kinds of danger, allowing new forms of governance to be pursued as a necessary counterformation. Consider, for example, the following official statements about insecurity in the United States framed in the future conditional:

This situation will continue as far ahead as anyone can foresee. We cannot return to “normalcy.” This is the “new normalcy.” Only by winning what at best will be a long war of endurance can we hope to avoid . . . the very possible destruction of civilization itself. (quoted in Chernus 2002, 44)

Homeland security is not a temporary measure just to meet one crisis. Many of the steps we have now been forced to take will become permanent in American life. They represent an understanding of the world as it is, and dangers we must guard against perhaps for decades to come. I think of it as the new normalcy. (Cheney 2001)

*As far as anyone can foresee* . The first statement—from July 1953—is by Eisenhower administration official James Lambie, who was charged with developing a national communications strategy to mobilize citizens in the thermonuclear age. In response, he helped craft one of the largest public education campaigns in U.S. history (a program that we remember today as civil defense), devoted to teaching citizens to fear the bomb in a specific way so as to prepare them for a potentially short nuclear or long cold war. The second evocation of a “new normal”—from an October 2001 speech to the Republican Governors Association—is by Vice President Dick Cheney, who also attempts to standardize danger and to create a new psychic infrastructure capable of accommodating a permanent, imminent danger. In both cases, existential threat is presented as both novel and emergent and is then positioned as the baseline reality for a new kind of everyday American life. Future crisis is projected—as concept—to be the basis for life at institutional, technological, and affective levels, reordering domestic politics and geopolitics in a startlingly economical gesture.

Declaring a “new” normal is thus anything but new as a state security practice in the United States. However, the objects, logics, and consequences of defense have significantly changed with the shift from the twentieth century’s nuclear “balance of terror” to the twenty-first century’s “War on Terror.” 3 Interrogating the links between the first decade of the Cold War and the first decade of the War on Terror is a central project of this book, which pays specific attention to how technological revolution, surprise, normality, and terror have been used to orchestrate a new kind of security culture. I pursue these comparisons not because they are absolutely symmetrical or simply code shifts from nuclear fear to terrorism, but because each iteration of the national security state announces itself through acts of normalization and naturalization (see Der Derian 2002). It is increasingly important to understand how historically crafted images and logics of imminent danger allow feelings to be nationalized and directed to produce antidemocratic actions and policy. These affective logics constitute a specific zone of interaction between citizens and the state, one that is the very basis for the social contract (which Hobbes once defined as the exchange of public obedience for collective security). As we shall see, national security affect is a special kind of collective experience, one that is central to enabling the technological and administrative capacities of the security state. Infrastructures—affective, imaginative, and material—are linked in the production of American power today, creating an unprecedented global projection of American fears and desires in the name of existential defense.

The Threat Matrix

Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, surprise and its opposite, anticipation, have been foundational concerns of the U.S. national security state. A formal rationale for the 1947 National Security Act (which created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the CIA) was to prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor—to prevent strategic surprise in the nuclear age. 4 U.S. policy makers immediately understood the power of the atomic bomb to be revolutionary, enabling U.S. leaders to threaten rival nations with “prompt and utter destruction,” as President Harry Truman did in July 1945, or with “shock and awe,” in the language of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 5 The ability to shock (at both psychic and material levels) and not experience shock, in other words, became a primary goal of the American security state after 1945. The national security state also sought right from the beginning to politically exploit the psychological effects of nuclear fear as much as the destructive physical capacities of nuclear weapons. This formulation of security makes the near future as well as the human nervous system specific objects of state scrutiny, with perceptions and temporalities of danger the guiding administrative logics of the security state.

At the start of the Cold War, the United States transformed an anticipated Soviet nuclear capability into the rationale for building a global technological system, which became the always-on-alert infrastructure of mutual assured destruction. The nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter (1958) famously called this the “delicate balance of terror,” a phrase that underscores the Cold War’s affective logics but not always its material reality. Indeed, the era of most acute nuclear paranoia in the United States was a largely self-generated effort to mobilize and coordinate citizens, officials, military personnel, and major social institutions through a new concept of nuclear terror. In the first decade of the War on Terror, the United States also committed to building an ever-expanding, always-on-alert global security apparatus, but one that had an astonishing new range of interests (weapons, people, data, microbes). This is a broad-based effort to create a kind of American power that can administer the global future, prevent rivals from amassing threatening power, and is never deterred or shocked. Counterterror is a project subject to constant failure, and precisely because it fails constantly, it energizes a hyperactive, and increasingly planetary, U.S. security apparatus, one that is forever striving to realize its imaginary potential.

For defense experts, the challenge of the September 2001 attack was not only its spectacular violence but also the shocking display of American vulnerability (see RETORT 2005). The fact that the global nuclear hyperpower could still suffer strategic surprise—and by suicide hijackers armed not with atomic bombs and state-of-the-art bombers, but with simple box cutters and commercial airplanes—challenged the existing rationale for the massive multigenerational investment in defense. The U.S. nuclear complex alone has cost over $6 trillion since 1943, a federal expenditure exceeded only by those for the nonnuclear military and social security (S. Schwartz 1998). Rather than enjoying the end of history with the demise of the Soviet Union and the start of a new, unipolar American century, U.S. security experts were shocked and shamed by the ease with which the attacks were carried out. Indeed, the attacks transformed the most powerful security apparatus in the world into a nervous system in a state of global panic (Taussig 1992). Immediately after the attacks, President Bush ordered that all potential threats made to U.S. interests around the world be routed directly to the White House. This unfiltered “threat matrix” became a daily exercise in expanding the field of imminent danger for decision makers, as unvetted threats piled on top of one another to create a world of seemingly endless and varied forms of danger, with verifiable information mixed in with rumor, error, and hearsay (Mayer 2008, 5).

By embracing an amplifying economy of fear, policy makers became the most terrified of American subjects. When a second wave of attacks hit on September 18, 2001, in the form of anthrax-filled letters aimed at top elected officials and figures in the news media, the result was a spectacularly consequential dislocation: the U.S. Congress moved into improvised facilities while its members deliberated some of the most important security legislation in U.S. history; at the same time, prominent media figures who might otherwise have been reporting on those deliberations instead focused on securing their work spaces from biological agents, while generating a proliferating and hysterical media narrative of imminent attack. In this context, key White House officials came to believe they had been victims of a chemical warfare attack when a “sensitive, specialized sensor, designed to alert anyone in the vicinity that the air they were breathing had been contaminated by potentially lethal radioactive, chemical, or biological agents” sounded (Mayer 2008, 3). This alarm led Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and others to believe that they might have been lethally infected by nerve gas. A faulty White House bioweapons sensor played a significant role in the evolution of the War on Terror, creating an affective atmosphere of immediate danger to officials huddled in their most secure facilities. At this moment of vulnerable uncertainty, every worst-case scenario might have been playing out in real time—a cascading set of imagined horrors and potentials. The ever-expanding threat matrix created both escalating responsibilities and new institutional opportunities to pursue specific visions of American power, which in turn allowed a vast range of interests to quickly agree on “terror” as the operative principle for a renewal and expansion of American power in the twenty-first century.

The inability to perfectly predict and preempt low-tech terroristic violence in 2001 enabled a new vision of the future to emerge among security experts, one in which nearly every aspect of American life was potentially at risk from unknown forces, requiring not only a conceptual remaking of the concept of “security” but also a new global apparatus to achieve it. Identifying threat, in all its myriad forms and temporalities, transformed the state security project from a focus on capabilities—that is, an expert effort to identify existing technological capacities of known enemies—to a world of what ifs. A key innovation of the counterterrorist state is this commitment to using the imaginary to locate danger. Since 2001 scenarios, speculations, and hypotheticals have been endowed with the power to drive American policy across the spectrum of government agencies, which are now charged not only with administering a day-to-day lived reality but also with responding to threatening probabilities, potentials, and possibilities before they become fact.

Consider, for example, how one branch of the Department of Defense (DOD) currently defines both its mission and U.S. national security:

The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) was established in 1958 to prevent strategic surprise from negatively impacting U.S. national security and create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military. To fulfill its mission, the Agency relies on diverse performers to apply multi-disciplinary approaches to both advance knowledge through basic research and create innovative technologies that address current practical problems through applied research. DARPA’s scientific investigations span the gamut from laboratory efforts to the creation of full-scale technology demonstrations in the fields of biology, medicine, computer science, chemistry, physics, engineering, mathematics, materials sciences, social sciences, neurosciences and more. As the DOD’s primary innovation engine, DARPA undertakes projects that are finite in duration but that create lasting revolutionary change. (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency n.d.)

To prevent strategic surprise at home while creating it for others through revolutionary technological change. DARPA announces itself programmatically here as an unending series of Manhattan Projects, using the full spectrum of scientific inquiry for U.S. national advantage. The success or failure of U.S. national security is thus determined by the register of surprise—a highly slippery term whose negation requires a specific ability to read the future, as well as the capacity to anticipate intentions, accidents, and opportunities on a global scale. DARPA’s mission statement also assumes nothing less than a permanent war posture and a planetary field of action.

When amplified across the global U.S. national security apparatus, the logics of threat designation and preemption transform counterterrorism into a project of constant affective recruitment and capacity generation. The Congressional Research Service estimates the formal costs of the first decade of the War on Terror at $1.4 trillion (Belasco 2011)—a vast U.S. expenditure that is in addition to the costs of maintaining the largest formal military budget in the world, which has almost doubled since 2001 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2011). The Watson Institute at Brown University estimates that total costs of the first decade of counterterror come closer to $4 trillion (Costsofwar.org 2013). The first decade of the War on Terror has produced multiple fronts: many Manhattan Project–like research programs located across the military sciences (from drones to cyberwar to biosecurity); the creation of a second defense department in the Department of Homeland Security; and a vast new commitment to intelligence gathering, data mining, global digital communications systems, and, above all, new forms of expert threat perception. Dana Priest and William Arkin have shown that since 2001 a new intelligence apparatus has been built that is too big for any single person to understand its reach, level of redundancy, or output. The authors found that over 850,000 people now have security clearances in counterterrorism alone, and generate some 50,000 reports a year. Priest and Arkin were able to identify “1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies” working on “programs related to counter-terrorism, homeland security, and intelligence at over 10,000 locations across the United States” (Priest and Arkin 2010, 1; see also 2011). Committed to recognizing vulnerabilities in the global web of U.S. interests and imagining proliferating vectors of foreign and domestic threat, the catastrophic terrorist future is now a competitive domain for security experts at multiple agencies and companies—making disaster calculation the major growth industry of the new century. The worst-case terrorist scenario is produced across this spectrum of expert activity, dictating the terms of the counterterror formation, and maintaining a charged hold on the concept of security as well as the future. The paradox is that despite this commitment to preemption and the fact that the United States outspends almost all other countries combined on its security, Americans in the twenty-first century are caught in multiple forms of crisis (economic, environmental, and political).

Counterterror is a mode of global engagement that attempts to extend U.S. military dominance but one that paradoxically generates new forms of insecurity: by installing technological and bureaucratic capabilities to preempt imagined threats, counterterror simultaneously creates new forms of uncertainty, ripple effects from expert practices that create their own realities and retaliations and threats. Every system has built into its infrastructure a future crisis: the counterterror state is loading new capacities into the future as well as the conditions of possibility for new nightmares not yet realized (Cazdyn 2007; see also Berlant 2007). This is not quite the epistemic murk that Michael Taussig (1987) encounters in the mutual terror of colonial-native encounters in rubber-boom Colombia, as its domain is the future instead of the present. But by allocating conceptual, material, and affective resources to ward off imagined but potentially catastrophic terroristic futures, the counterterror state also creates the conditions for those catastrophic futures to emerge. It does so by generating new arms races; increasing international blowback from war, covert actions, and drone strikes; and by not responding to existing suffering at home and abroad with the same urgency as it addresses real and imagined terrorist acts. A perverse effect of the counterterror system is that failure and disaster, like surprise and shock, can be absorbed as part of its internal circuit, authorizing an expansion of the number of objects to be surveilled and secured, empowering expert speculation about the various forms of danger that might emerge from an ever-shifting landscape of information and potential threat. Thus, for defense experts most of all, an affective recruitment to constant crisis is one of the chief effects of the counterterror formation—which is self-colonizing, opening a potentially endless conceptual space of worry and projected dangers.

Counterterror thus approaches the American future as both already ruined—a boundless source of violence—and as perfectible—a conceptual universe requiring radical social and technological engineering and intervention. One powerful effect of these administrative logics is that demilitarizing becomes increasingly impossible to imagine, as potential dangers pile up for experts, while citizens feel increasingly insecure with the diversion of funds and psychic energies from everyday welfare to anticipatory defense (see Gusterson and Besteman 2009). Counterterror, then, constitutes itself as an endless horizon, providing a self-justifying rationale for radical expenditures and action—offering a potentially eternal project for the security state. For when can the future ever be perfectly secured? When can terror ever be eradicated from both thought and action? Threat, as an imaginary engagement with the future, is limitless, offering an ever-expanding field of potentials, possibilities, and fears for counterterror governance.

Gaming Death

Perceptions of the future are affectively laden, as well as tied to expert judgment and information; they are based on feelings and intensities that can be nonrational but that link people together through threat-based projection. Put differently, one can be afraid only of that which one knows to fear. Fear requires a kind of familiarity with danger that the future does not allow us full access to. In the realm of esoteric military technologies—weapons of mass destruction, for example—the general public has no expert knowledge to draw on and must instead be educated to think and feel a particular way about technological capacities and worst-case outcomes. Rehearsing the end of the nation-state at the level of imagination has consequently been a core American project since the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with each generation embracing its own concept of nation-ending apocalyptic danger, consolidated most powerfully in the image of the mushroom cloud.

The innovation of the War on Terror is that it formally rejects deterrence, with its focus on global stability, as an objective in favor of preemption —an unending manipulation of the future for national advantage. The counterterror state is devoted to locating and/or conjuring up images of dangers from an unrealized future and then combating each of those alternate futures as if they were material and imminent threats. In this way, imagined futures and the affects they produce have become institutionalized as national security policy, creating a form of expert judgment that is at war with its own apocalyptic imaginary before it meets the real world, creating a massively productive form of militarization that is easily delinked from evidence, facts, or the observable in the name of confronting and eliminating potentially cataclysmic future danger. How did this kind of governance come to be?

The origins of the preemptive, counterterror state reside in the logics and lessons of the Cold War. The nuclear arms race, with its minute-to-minute calculation of threat and advantage and the always ready-to-launch nuclear war machine, was an effort to stabilize the present by loading nuclear destruction into the everyday and continually displacing it by a few minutes into the future. Mutual assured destruction promised that any state that started a nuclear war would only minutes later be destroyed by it, an unprecedented compression of time, space, and destructive capability in the name of global defense. To make this system work, U.S. defense experts not only built nuclear weapons and delivery systems that could function in any environment, launch within minutes, and operate on a planetary scale, but they also gamed, modeled, and fantasized future war scenarios incessantly (see Ghamari-Tabrizi 2005). Locating security in intercontinental missile systems that were never fully tested and trusting a vast web of machines, institutions, and people to respond perfectly in the first moments of global crisis, the nuclear war machine was designed first and foremost to produce fear of the near future in adversaries and to harness that fear to produce a stable bipolar world. The Cold War system was therefore saturated with affective and imaginary recruitments as well as anticipatory logics. Deterrence, however, restrained both sides of the conflict, putting a break on both U.S. and Soviet desires and aggressions. The Cold War focus on nuclear weapons and delivery systems also set material parameters for the speculative expert imaginary; it focused experts’ attention on the numbers and types of Soviet weapons, their deployments and machinic capabilities (speed and force), as well as on the psychologies of nuclear command and control. These technoscientific forms were never free of political calculation but had a material basis: Donald MacKenzie (1990) has shown how the accuracy of intercontinental missiles was determined in the United States not by exacting experimental proof but rather by a political consensus among all the interested scientific, military, and industrial parties (adding an unacknowledged uncertainty to nuclear targeting going forward). Similarly, Lynn Eden (2004) has shown how the urban consequences of fire from nuclear explosions fell out of formal nuclear war planning in the 1960s, enabling the development of nuclear war and civil defense concepts that vastly underestimated the material effects of each detonation and allowed far greater numbers of U.S. weapons to be deployed globally (see also Gusterson 2008).

In other words, although nuclear war remained at the conceptual stage after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it was fought incessantly at the level of the imagination, with an unending state-based commitment to trying to model, game, intuit, and assess the likely actions of all parties in a nuclear conflict. By contrast the future imagined by counterterror officials today is an endless spectrum of threat, with a proliferating set of objects, vectors, scales, and possibilities—a spectrum that is literally not bounded by time, space, technology, or the rules of evidence. By defining terror as constantly emergent, the counterterror state also assumes an open-ended futurity that cannot be deterred by external forces. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (2002) famously put it in a press conference about the (ultimately fictional) threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the U.S. invasion, the counterterror state needs to make not-yet-visible dangers its central concern because:

Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones. And so people who have the omniscience that they can say with high certainty that something has not happened or is not being tried, have capabilities . . . they can do things I can’t do.

“Unknown unknowns” can now be the basis for war. Here, Rumsfeld transforms a catastrophic future at the level of the speculative imaginary into an urgent problem of counterterror. Security is thus constituted as both a necessity (to defend against catastrophic shock) and as an unachievable goal (as the future is an inexhaustible source of threat), a perverse logic that the counterterror state uses to drive increasing calls for resources, technical capacities, and agency. In the first decade of counterterror, a strategic mobilization by security officials of the unknown, not yet emergent, or invisible danger has powerfully overturned long-standing American democratic values about the rule of law, the treatment of captives, the surveillance of citizens, and the necessity of covert actions. It has transformed intuitions and desires into policy, invalidated long-standing forms of expert judgment that worked to constrain official fears by attending to material reality, and—as a result—has enabled deadly actions in the absence of facts. Rumsfeld’s vision—precisely because it transforms the unknown into a space of terror requiring immediate action—simultaneously validates and eliminates the possibility of factual evidence, creating both a rationale for unrestrained American power and a security apparatus of constantly expanding capacities and infrastructures. This logic renders security itself obsolete, replacing it with a constant conceptual agitation and physical mobilization. Threat (as pure potential) is used to enable a radically active and ever emerging counterterror state, allowing action to be favored over restraint, possibilities over capabilities, hypotheticals over knowledge.

Excitable Subjects

The uniquely destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the speed of their potential delivery constituted a new kind of technologically mediated existential threat after 1945, one that made feelings (fear, terror, shock, aggression, futility, revenge) a new national project. I argue in this book that the first and most powerful effect of the nuclear revolution in the United States was the constitution of a new affective politics, one that informs the evolution of the national security state to this day and that is key to the formation of the counterterror state. Put differently, in the age of thermonuclear war, the security state became a committed affect theorist, investing substantial multidisciplinary resources in efforts to understand public morale, contagious affects (panic, fear, terror), resilience, resolve, and the long-term effects of stress. The nuclear balance of terror was always an all-encompassing formation, creating a new executive (a president preauthorized to start a nuclear war any second of the day) and a new citizen-subject (recruited to reorganize everyday life around the minute-to-minute reality of nuclear danger). Military science funded extensive research on affects, feelings, and emotions with the goal of both psychologically strengthening and militarizing American society, using nuclear fear to calibrate officials and citizens alike through a new image of collective death.

National security affect has thus become a new kind of infrastructure—a “structure of feeling,” to use Raymond Williams’s felicitous phrase (1978, 132)—that is historically produced, shared, and officially constituted as a necessary background condition of everyday life (see Stoler 2009). It is based on fears that are officially sanctioned and promoted as a means of coordinating citizens as members of a national security state. It can be a specific and negative form of what Kathleen Stewart calls “ordinary affects” (2007), in the sense that certain kinds of fear are now coded into social life as potentials that can be triggered by small events—fear of the unattended suitcase in the airport, for example—or directly recruited by official statements, such as terrorist alert warnings. National security affect also relies on a specific political aesthetic, one that rehearses certain forms and images to produce what Jacques Rancière calls a “sensuous shock” that limits thought as much as expands it (2009, 6; see also M. Hansen 2004). The goal of a national security system is to produce a citizen-subject who responds to officially designated signs of danger automatically, instinctively activating logics and actions learned over time through drills and media indoctrination. An individual’s response to this kind of emotional call (in either the affirmative or negative) reveals his or her membership in a national community. Indeed, the production of a fearful and docile public in the nuclear age has been historically matched by the rise of vibrant activist movements (across the antinuclear, peace, justice, and environmental spectrum), counterpublics that mirror the intensities of officially sanctioned nuclear terror in pursuit of different collective futures. 6

An affective atmosphere of everyday anxiety (Anderson 2009), grounded in an understanding that accidents, disasters, and attacks can happen at any moment of the day, is transformed into individualized emotion by specific events, becoming a personalized and deeply felt experience. As Stewart puts it, “what affects us—the sentience of a situation—is also a dwelling, a worlding born from an atmospheric attunement” (2011, 449). I argue in this book that national security affect has a specific form in the United States, one that is tied to a deep structural investment in the atomic bomb and that has been recalibrated and expanded since 2001 to address a new concept of terror (consolidated in the logic of the WMD ). American citizens have been taught through official and mass-media campaigns to attune themselves to the possibility of terroristic violence as an unlimited daily potential. This new concept of terror maintains the minute-to-minute threat made familiar by decades of Cold War nuclear culture, but it is different in that it is an open-ended concept, one that links hugely diverse kinds of threats (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to be sure, but also attacks on the public image of the United States, computer hacking, infectious disease, and disruptions to daily life, to name but a few) and treats them all as equally imminent, equally catastrophic.

Counterterror today requires a continual expansion of the security state, reaching a limit only when its key objects attain planetary scale (exhausting space) or when federal monies run out (exhausting resources). That is, counterterror sets no conceptual or territorial limit to defense, scaling its problems up to the ultimate spatial unit—the earth—while offering an unlimited call for resources to secure life from the species to the population to the individual to the microbe. In this manner, counterterror produces a highly mobile sovereignty, one that uses the potential of catastrophic future events as a means of overcoming legal, ethical, and political barriers in the here and now and that is endlessly searching for new objects of concern. However, this commitment to total security—and the constant failure to achieve it—creates an unending bureaucratic circuit where shock requires ever more militarization and normalization in the name of warding off future shock.

A war on shock, like a war on terror, locates national security within the human nervous system itself, constituting a peculiarly embodied psychopolitics (Orr 2006) that fuses an energetic apocalyptic imagination with both an immediate and deep future. Conceptually, a national security project of this kind would seem to offer only two means of achieving stability: first, by changing the nature of the individual at the level of emotions, senses, and psychology so that he or she experiences threat in a different manner—a project of normalization through militarization; and second, by changing the global environment in the hope of eliminating the possibility of danger. The Cold War state and the counterterror state in specific formulations have attempted to do both: endeavoring to produce a new citizen who is tuned to the specific threats of the age and psychologically capable of supporting permanent war, while simultaneously mobilizing U.S. economic and military power to change the international system, in the hope of eradicating threat on a planetary basis. However, the impossibility of this dual effort to produce a completely compliant citizen incapable of resisting the national security state or to eliminate danger on a planetary scale creates an endless feedback loop of shock, normalization, and militarization. We could say that this recursive system is what constitutes the United States as a global hyperpower, but an increasingly fragile one—as experts see danger coming in all physical dimensions (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) as well as in all temporal conditions (past, present, and future). This requires a new kind of expert psychopolitics that is not grounded in the effort to establish facts but rather is committed to generating speculative futures (imagined dangers of cataclysmic scale) that it will then need to counter. Security thus becomes a highly conceptual enterprise, one that moves past statistical, fact-based, or capability-based assessments of risk (see Collier 2008; De Goede 2008). Threat assessment—with all its imaginative, affective recruitments—becomes the chief domain of counterterror.

The inability to perfectly predict and counter threat creates in the American security system the opportunity to constitute nearly every domain and object of everyday life as a potential vector of attack, creating a national security project that performs as a nearly perfect paranoid system, but one with planetary reach. Peter Sloterdijk has noted that a nervous condition is an attribute of globalization, which he sees as:

the establishment of the system of synchronous stress on a global scale. This has progressed to such an extent that those who do not make themselves continuously available for synchronous stress seem asocial. Excitability is now the foremost duty of all citizens. This is why we no longer need military service. What is required is the general theme of duty, that is to say, a readiness to play your role as a conductor of excitation for collective, opportunist psychoses. (Sloterdijk and Henrichs 2001, 82)

Excitability is now the foremost duty of all citizens . The circulation of affect, the ability to be coordinated as subjects through felt intensities rather than reason at a mass level, is a core aspect of modern life (see Mazzarella 2010; Clough 2007, 19; Orr 2006). The atomic bomb is one key origin of this kind of governance (see Lutz 1997, 247), a WMD that greatly expanded American power but that also created a world of constant existential danger, one that was quite formally managed for generations by suturing collective life to an imminent destruction located in each minute of the day. A security culture of existential threat was embedded quite thoroughly in American society and U.S. security institutions by decades of Cold War, allowing national politics of every kind (domestic, international, activist) to be positioned as a matter of collective life or collective death. From this perspective, terror is a familiar mode of governance in the United States, one that was merely reconstituted in 2001 with a new set of objects, ambitions, and concerns.

#### That the Aff “engages” \*is\* the link. It is perceived as softening the US, but only serves the objective of greater violence in the face of that false softening.

Buchanan 5

Ian Buchanan, foundation Chair of Communication and Cultural Studies at Charles Darwin University, “War in the age of intelligent machines and unintelligent government” 2005, Research Online, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, KB

The 2004 US election must have caused hearts to sink everywhere in the Third World. The bloody insurgency in Iraq only strengthened the position of the 'War President', giving him greater license to continue his campaign of terror. At the time of the election the death toll of US soldiers was nearing a thousand with the number injured seven times that. To which toll one must add the haunting fact that of the 500 000 plus US servicemen and women who served in the First Gulf War some 325 000 are now on disability pensions suffering a variety of acute maladies generally attributed to the toxic cocktail of radiation and other pollutant chemicals from the hundreds of oil fires they were exposed to during their tour of duty. Those who fight in Iraq today can scarcely look forward to a healthier future given that it is effectively twice as irradiated now as it was in 1991.1 Yet still the minority who vote voted in the main for the man who put these soldiers in harm's way; but then it isn't as though John Kerry was promising to bring the troops home. As important as Tom Frank's What's the Matter with Kansas? is as explanation of conservatism in the heartland of the USA, it doesn't answer this question - why did the war on terror fail to ignite anti-Bush sentiment?2 More to the point, why was it impossible to vote against the war? This is militarism at its peak - you cannot decide between going to war or not, only which is the most desired (least worst?) way of handling the conduct of the war.

Problem: Is today's militarism really new?

Militarism has always been with us, like a dark shadow, but its history is not continuous. The idea that war should be considered a logical and necessary extension of politics was given expression by Clausewitz, but he was merely putting into philosophical form what was already accepted thinking in government: arms are a legitimate means of achieving political goals. Militarism is not always as unabashed about its existence, not to say its intentions, as it is now when - as Debord so presciently put it - it has “its own inconceivable foe, terrorism” to bedazzle a frightened, confused, and misinformed public.3

But out of the limelight does not mean out of the picture; militarism has not been officially questioned since the end of the first world war when disarmament had its last genuine hurrah. World War Two, which caught the US and the UK, in particular, underarmed and underprepared for conflict, eliminated in a stroke the very concept of disarmament - strategic arms limitation and force reduction are essentially fiscal notions, decisions made in the interest in preserving a militarist posture in the face of rising costs, not disarmament. Neither should we delude ourselves that anti-war is anti-militarism. As we shall see, the very opposite is true.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, it is generally thought that a paradigm shift in the nature of militarism has occurred, and as the violence in the Middle East continues with no sign of abatement in sight (the running-sore that is the Israel/Palestine conflict, the smouldering fires of Iraq and Afghanistan and the gathering storm in Iran all forebode ill for a peaceful future) any doubt that a new era of 'hot' war has been ushered in tends to vanish. What is less certain, however, at least from a philosophical perspective, is the conceptual nature of the change. Those who demur that the present era is substantially different enough to warrant the label 'new' do so on the grounds that what we are seeing today is merely the continuation of an older struggle, or struggles, as it might be better to say given the tangled mess of multiple rivalries and resentments on both sides. Obviously, many of the struggles fuelling the present war are legacies of the Second World War, the Yalta summit in particular (many of course predate that by hundreds of years).4 On this score, I am persuaded by Immanuel Wallerstein's thesis that the first and second world wars should be treated as a single thirty year struggle for global hegemony between Germany and the USA, but it seems to me the militarism we are faced with today is different to the one spawned in 1945 in the aftermath of victory; the militarism of today no longer thinks in terms of winning and losing - it has another agenda.5 So even if the origins of the present crisis are to be found in the wash-up of WWII, as Wallerstein and many others have rightly argued, the nature of the response to this crisis is not similarly located there.

Historians generally agree that the Vietnam War put paid to that 'victorious' mode of militarism the US knew following WWII when it was briefly the lone nuclear power.6 Following its demoralising defeat at the hands of a comparatively puny third world country, however, even the idea that it was a superpower was questioned. Amongst the decisionmakers in Washington there took hold a moribund and risk-averse mentality that came to be called the 'Vietnam Syndrome'. This syndrome allegedly explains the US's failure to act on a number of occasions when it might have been prudent - or, as perhaps would have been the case in Cambodia, humanitarian to do so - culminating in the embarrassing mishandling of the Teheran Embassy siege in the last days of Jimmy Carter's administration. It also explains the tactics used on those occasions when the US has acted, as in Clinton's decision to initially restrict the engagement in the Balkans to airpower alone and use aerial bombardment where deft geopolitical negotiation was needed. On this occasion, as has now become routine, an alleged ethical imperative combined powerfully with a rhetoric of 'surgical strikes' and 'smart bombs' to stall protest and garner support from even those who ought to have known better.7 Taken at face value, this would seem to confirm the existence of the 'Vietnam Syndrome', but when in political analysis is it sensible to accept something at face value? I would argue the 'Vietnam Syndrome' is a convenient cover story not a genuine explanation of US foreign policy. What makes anyone think, for instance, that a peaceful settlement to the Israel/Palestine conflict (as much a potential Vietnam as Iraq ) is on the US agenda? Countless commentators have pointed out that the US backing of Israel can but inflame the Middle East situation as though this was news to the ones responsible, or, more to the point, as though winning or losing, peace or war, are the only options open to US foreign policy. Isn't the answer staring us right in the face: perpetual unrest is the solution that present action is achieving.

The 'Vietnam Syndrome' is an optical illusion, a wish-fulfilment on the part of those who would like to see an end to US imperialism.8 In philosophical terms, the 'Vietnam Syndrome' was the negative needed by militarism to resurrect itself. What the military realised in Vietnam is that the US public will not tolerate a high casualty rate amongst its own troops unless there is a pressing need. While saving freedom might be construed as a pressing need, stopping communism in a country most people hadn't heard of before the war started couldn't. Lacking ideological support, the US military publicly adopted a zero-casualty approach to its 'elective wars' (to continue with the surgical trope) and banked on technology to achieve it. The anti-war sentiment ignited by the Vietnam conflict played a large part in securing public acceptance for this strategy in spite of the escalating costs it entailed. The US showed it was anti-war only to the extent that war put its people in harm's way, but had no strong opinion on the matter when it was merely a question of unloading deadly ordinance from a high altitude on faceless peoples far from the homeland. Whatever the eventual cost, and the figures for military expenditure are always astronomical (consider the 2004 budget of $400 billion a year to wage war in Iraq), technology was to become the solution to what is essentially an ideological problem, the US population isn't willing to commit its body to the US's military causes.9 After Vietnam, no administration of the future could afford to be soft on military spending (if they lost spending $30 billion a year, they could hardly afford to spend less in the future is the presiding logic).10 The spin-doctoring that has gone into talking up the capabilities of the new class of so-called 'smart' weapons is worthy of Madison Avenue.11 Its effect has been to persuade the American people that technology has made them invulnerable. Thus war has entered the age of intelligent machines and unintelligent government.12

In any case, the present conflict proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that the US will not hesitate to embroil itself in a potentially Vietnam-like conflict if the conditions are ripe. I have read reports that US soldiers based in Iraq are writing 'Is this Vietnam yet?' on their helmets, sadly they're not asking the right question. Given the admission that the insurgency problem may never be resolved it plainly is another Vietnam. If this isn't the view of the Hawks in Washington who orchestrated the war, and I don't believe for a second that it is, then it begs the question: what makes the present conflict not another Vietnam in the eyes of its architects? What are the conditions under which the US will engage in a potentially protracted foreign war? To answer this we have to ask what were the lessons of Vietnam? Behind the smokescreen of the 'Vietnam Syndrome', the US has taken on board two hard lessons learned in Vietnam which shape its foreign policy: (1) It can win battles, but it can't necessarily win wars; (2) It can afford battles, but it can't pay for wars. Both of these lessons were heeded by Bush the elder who pointedly decided not to take Baghdad though it was there for the taking precisely because he didn't want an expensive quagmire.13 It is tempting to think Bush the younger is simply Bush the dumber and that's the reason why he felt emboldened to go where his daddy dare not, but I believe there is an even more sinister explanation. Whereas daddy figured out how to get someone else to pay for the battles that needed to be fought to dislodge Saddam's forces from Kuwait, he didn't solve the problem of how to pay for a long war so he avoided it. Neither did the son, but he figured out how to get the loser to line the pockets of the victor and transform a costly war into a privateer's mother lode.14 The father's expensive quagmire is the son's reconstruction goldmine. Reconstruction is the surplus value of war. If, as Chalmers Johnson suggests the US military has gone Hollywood, then war has gone Wall St.15 Profit is put before everything.16

But we still haven't articulated what turned out to be the greatest change to militarism. This occurred in the late stages of the Vietnam War, past the point when anyone - not even the President of the United States - could say there was any worthwhile military reason to continue the fight, apart from the need to defend the credibility of the fighting forces. The last years of the war saw the first outing of what has now become standard procedure, the use of airpower as a substitute for diplomacy. At the time it was narrated as being a necessary complement to diplomacy to insure proper attention at the bargaining table, but its effect was to make the North Vietnamese dig their heels in harder. And yet the US persisted in spite of its obvious failure as a tactic, convinced no doubt that there had to be a limit to the willingness of the people of North Vietnam to endure the terrible toll of death its B52s were able to lay upon them. Ho Chi Minh's bravado claim that Vietnam had struggled against China for a thousand years before winning its freedom, and had carried the fight to the French for one hundred and fifty years, and therefore felt unthreatened by the US who had only been on their soil a mere fifteen years plainly fell on deaf ears in Washington. The cost in lives of this tactic has never been officially toted up, but doubtless it was not inconsiderable. It is generally assessed as a military and diplomatic failure, but this is where I think history is being a little hasty. The determination that it was the credibility of the fighting forces that was at stake in the final years of the war is no doubt correct, but as with all political manoeuvres it shouldn't be taken at face value. For Wallerstein, the Vietnam War represented a rejection by the Third World of the ' Yalta accord', the less than gentlemanly agreement between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, to divide the planet into spheres of interest (the USA grabbing two-thirds and the USSR a third). He treats America's willingness to invest all its military strength into the struggle and more or less bankrupt itself in the process as testament to the felt geopolitical significance of the conflict. And yet, as he puts it, they were still defeated. While I accept the first part of his thesis, I disagree with his conclusion because I think the very premise on which it rests lost its validity in the course of the war. A pragmatically conceived intervention designed to stop the spread of revolutionary communism became the US military's own equivalent of a 'cultural revolution' as it underwent a profound rethinking of its mode of acting in the world.17 I do not mean to claim as military revisionists have done that Vietnam was actually a victory for the USA (the right wing rhetoric on this, so resonant of the early days of the Nazi party, is that the government and the people back home betrayed the soldiers on the front line and didn't allow them to win).18 With Baudrillard, I want to argue that there occurred a paradigm shift during the course of that protracted and bitter struggle which resulted in the concepts of victory and defeat losing their meaning.

Why did this American defeat (the largest reversal in the history of the USA ) have no internal repercussions in America? If it had really signified the failure of the planetary strategy of the United States, it would necessarily have completely disrupted its internal balance and the American political system. Nothing of the sort occurred. Something else, then, took place.19

Baudrillard's answer to this question is that war ceased to be real, it ceased to be determined in terms of winning and losing and became instead 'simulation', a pure spectacle no less terrifying or deadly for its lack of reality. The consequences of this metaphysical adjustment are shocking and go a long way towards explaining the rise of terrorism in recent years. As Andrew Bacevich writes, it is not only the superpowers like the US that have relinquished the concept of victory. It is as though war itself has jettisoned it as so much extra baggage. “The typical armed conflict today no longer pits like against like - field army v. field army or battle fleet v. battle fleet - and there usually is no longer even the theoretical prospect of a decisive outcome. In asymmetric conflicts, combatants employ violence indirectly. The aim is not to defeat but to intimidate and terrorise, with women a favoured target and sexual assault often the weapon of choice.”20 The B52 pilot unloading bombs on an unseen enemy below knows just as well as the suicide bomber in Iraq that his actions will not lead directly to a decisive change, that in a sense the gesture is futile; but, he also knows, as does the suicide bomber, that his actions will help create an atmosphere of fear that, it is hoped, will one day lead to change. Deprived of teleology, war thrives in an eternal present.

Terror is not merely the weapon of the weak, it is the new condition of war, and no power can claim exception status. For Clausewitz and his spiritual tutor Machiavelli the only rational reason to wage war is to win where winning means achieving a predetermined and clearly prescribed goal. Britain's colonial wars are an obvious case in point. The self-serving claim that Britain acquired its empire in a fit of absence owes its sense to the fact that it never set out to gain its eventually quite considerable empire (it was at least geographically true, albeit not historically true, that the sun never set on the British Empire, encompassing as it did territories in virtually every region of the world) all at once as Hitler and Hirohito were later to do, but built it one territory at a time over a two century-long period. Through a sequence of limited wars it was able to deploy its limited means to obtain colossal riches. The first world war essentially started out in the same way. Germany's goal was to secure a European empire before it was too late, but the machine-gun put paid to that ambition and instead of a quick war returning a specific prize there irrupted a global conflagration that was to consume the wealth and youth of Europe. As Wallerstein argues, the true victor of the first world war wasn't Britain or France, but American industry, and by extension the true loser wasn't Germany and its allies but Europe itself. Eric Hobsbawm has defined the twentieth century as the age when wars of limited means and limited aims gave way to wars of limited means and unlimited aims.21 The twenty-first century appears to be the age of wars of unlimited means and no precise aim.

This, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “is the point at which Clausewitz's formula is effectively reversed”. When total war - i.e., war which not only places the annihilation of the enemy's army at its centre but its entire population and economy too - becomes the object of the State-appropriated war machine, “then at this level in the set of all possible conditions, the object and the aim enter into new relations that can reach the point of contradiction.” In the first instance, the war machine unleashed by the State in pursuit of its object, total war, remains subordinate to the State and “merely realises the maximal conditions” 22 of its aims. Paradoxically, though, the more successful it is in realising the State's aims, the less controllable by the State it becomes. As the State's aims grow on the back of the success of its war machine, so the restrictions on the war machine's object shrink until - scorpion like - it effectively subsumes the State, making it just one of its many moving parts. In Vietnam, the State was blamed for the failure of the war machine precisely because it attempted to set limits on its object. Its inability to adequately impose these limits not only cost it the war, but in effect its sovereignty too. Since then the State has been a puppet of a war machine global in scope and ambition. This is the status of militarism today and no-one has described its characteristics more chillingly than Deleuze and Guattari:

This worldwide war machine, which in a way 'reissues' from the States, displays two successive figures: first, that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited movement with no other aim than itself; but fascism is only a rough sketch, and the second, postfascist, figure is that of a war machine that takes peace as its object directly, as the peace of Terror or Survival. The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth. Total war is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still.23

It is undoubtedly Chalmers Johnson who has done the most to bring to our attention the specific make-up of what Deleuze and Guattari call here the worldwide war machine.24 His description of a global 'empire of bases' is consistent with Deleuze and Guattari's uptake of Paul Virilio's concept of the 'fleet in being'. This is the paradoxical transformation of the striated space of organisation into a new kind of 'reimparted' smooth space “which outflanks all gridding and invents a neonomadism in the service of a war machine still more disturbing than the States”.25 Bases do not by themselves secure territory, but as is the case with a battle fleet their mobility and their firepower mean they can exert an uncontestable claim over territory that amounts to control. This smooth space surrounding the earth is, to put it back into Baudrillard's terms, the space of simulation. The empire of bases is a virtual construct with real capability. Fittingly enough, it was Jean Baudrillard who first detected that a structural change in post-WWII militarism had taken place. In Simulacra and Simulation he argues that the Vietnam War was a demonstration of a new kind of will to war, one that no longer thought in terms of winning or losing, but defined itself instead in terms of perseverance.26 It demonstrated to the US's enemies, clients and allies alike its willingness to continue the fight even when defeat was certain, or had in a sense already been acknowledged (the US strategy of 'Vietnamising' the war which commenced shortly after the Tet offensive in 1968, and become official policy under Nixon, was patently an admission that the war couldn't be won - in the short term it was Johnson's way of putting off admitting defeat until after the election so as to give Hubert Humphrey some chance of victory; in the longer term it was a way of buying time for a diplomatic solution).27 It was a demonstration of the US's reach, of its ability to inflict destruction even when its troops were withdrawing and peace talks (however futile) were under way. It also demonstrated to the American people that the fight could be continued as the troops were withdrawn, a factor that as I've already pointed out would become decisive in re-shaping militarism as an incorporeal system.

It was also a demonstration to the American domestic population that the country's leaders were willing to continue to sacrifice lives to prove this point.28 The contrary view, that Nixon wanted to end the war sooner but was unable to do so because domestic politics didn't allow it, in no way contradicts this thesis. If anything it confirms it because if true it would mean, as Deleuze and Guattari have said of fascism, “at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions”, the American people wanted Vietnam, and, as they add, “it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.”29 While there can be no doubt Vietnam was an unpopular war that was eventually brought to a halt by popular pressure, it is a sobering thought to remind oneself that it was a war that lasted some 10 years. If one takes 1967 as the decisive turning point in popular opinion, the moment when protest against the war became the prevailing view and support for it dwindled into a minority murmur, then one still has to take stock of the fact that it took a further 6 years for US troops to be fully withdrawn.30 The kind of sustained popular pressure that brought the Vietnam War to a close has not yet even begun to build in the US in spite of the fact that the death toll has passed 1500 (as of March 2005).

Wars are spectacles in the traditional sense of being events staged to convey a specific message, but also in the more radical or postmodern sense that spectacle is the final form of war, the form war takes when it takes peace as its object. Hence the military's facilitation of the media (this backfired to a large degree in Vietnam, but the lessons learned then are put to good use today). Ultimately, though, as Baudrillard rightly argues, the “media and official news services are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality, of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of the facts.”31 Chomsky's analyses of current trends in US imperialism confirm this thesis. As he argues, 'preventive' wars are only fought against the basically defenceless.32 Chomsky adds two further conditions that chime with what we have already adduced: there must be something in it for the aggressor, i.e., a fungible return not an intangible moral reward, and the opponent must be susceptible to a portrayal of them as 'evil', allowing the victory to be claimed in the name of a higher moral purpose and the actual venal purpose to be obscured.33 At first glance, waging war to prevent war appears to be as farcical as fucking for virginity, but that is only if we assume that the aim of the war is to prevent one potential aggressor from striking first. Or, rather, given that it is alleged that the putative enemy, Al Qaeda and its supposed supporters, took first blood (the Rambo reference is of course deliberate), we are asked to believe the current war is being fought to prevent a second, more damaging strike. The obsessive and suitably grave references to Weapons of Mass Destruction by the various mouthpieces of the Bush regime (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, but also Blair and Howard) is plainly calculated to compel us to accept that any such second strike will be of biblical, or worse, Hollywood proportions.

As one joke put it, the Americans could be certain that Iraq had at least some Weapons of Mass Destruction because they had the receipts to prove it. The grain of truth in this joke reveals the true purpose of the war - it was a demonstration to all of America's clients that it wouldn't tolerate 'price-gouging'. Obviously I am speaking metaphorically here, but the fact is that Iraq is a client of the US, it purchases arms and consumer goods and sells oil at a carefully controlled price. Why this arrangement suddenly became so unsatisfactory is subject to a great deal of speculation which centre on two basic theories: (1) when Iraq switched from the dollar to the euro it posed an intolerable threat to the stability of the US currency; (2) the US is positioning itself to monopolise oil ahead of growing Chinese demand. Either way, if one wants a metaphor to describe US imperialism it wouldn't it wouldn't be MacDonald's, a comparatively benign operator, but the predatory retail giant Wal-Mart.34 In other words, today's wars are fought to demonstrate will. The age of gunboat diplomacy has given way to the age of gunboat commerce.35

When war changed its object it was able to change its aim too and it is this more than anything that has saved 'real' war from itself. Baudrillard's later work on the spectacle of war misses this point: through becoming spectacles the fact that real wars (i.e., territorial wars) are no longer possible has not diminished their utility - the US isn't strong enough to take and hold Iraq, but it can use its force to demonstrate to other small nations that it can inflict massive damage and lasting pain on anyone who would dare defy it. Baudrillard's lament that the real Gulf War never took place can only be understood from this viewpoint - although he doesn't put it in these words, his insight is essentially that war in its Idealised form is much more terrifying than peace. Again, although Baudrillard himself doesn't put it this way, the conclusion one might draw from the paradigm shift in war's rationalisation enumerated above - from pragmatic object (defeating North Vietnam) to symbolic object (defending the credibility of the fight forces) -is that war has become 'postmodern'.36 This shift is what enables the US to ideologically justify war in the absence of a proper object and indeed in the absence of a known enemy. The Bush regime's 'War on Terror' is the apotheosis of this change: the symbolic (terror) has been made to appear instrumental (terrorism), or more precisely the symbolic is now able to generate the instrumental according to its own needs.

#### Their demand for a praxis-oriented alt is the problem. It rests at the heart of imperial actomania. A deeper genealogy of American imperialism is the only way to avoid error replication and structural violence.

Spanos 8 (William V Spanos, distinguished professor of English at Binghamton University, PhD from the University of Wisconsin, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 26-31, modified)

I will return later in this book to Said’s provocative retrieval of empire’s spectral Others—his bringing of this marginalized figure out of the shadows of imperialism’s periphery to center stage, as it were. It will suffice here to suggest that by thus assuming the exilic perspective of the Abgeschiedene in addressing the question of global colonialism, it should now be clear that my intervention has not been intended to mimic the by now commonplace critical imperative of a certain “postcolonial” discourse, usually identified with Salmon Rushdie and Malek Alloula, in which “the Empire writes back” to the imperial “center.”32 This critical initiative, perhaps needless to say, has contributed significantly, especially by way of identifying the colonial project with cultural, specifically literary, production, to the inauguration of an anticolonial discourse that would be commensurate to the complex and multisituated operations of American (neo)colonialism in the “postimperial” age of globalization, above all, in that phase that has been represented by its intellectual deputies as the “end of history” and is now bearing witness to America’s unilateral imposition of capitalist democracy on “rogue states” that threaten the “American Peace.” But, as I have suggested, it remains inadequate to this most difficult of tasks, not impossible. This inadequacy is not simply the result of this criticism’s vestigial adherence to the kind of imperial thinking it would interrogate (i.e., its not being postcolonial— exilic or, rather, “a-part”—enough).33 It is also, and primarily, the result of a paradoxically limited historical sense. Despite its insistent appeal to history against theory, this praxis-oriented “postcolonial” criticism, like the genealogical criticism of Foucault and even Said, from which it ultimately derives, is not historical enough. In keeping with its indifference to, if not its antitheoretical bias against theory, it has, in fact, reduced the critical potential of this resonant motif of resistance by restricting the genealogy of imperialism by and large to the modern era—from the age of exploration in the fifteenth century to the age of imperialism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In overlooking its own origins in the exilic “theory” that emerged in response to the decisive self-destruction of the imperial (onto)logic of the discourse of the Occident in the middle of the twentieth century, this postcolonial discourse, in other words, has also lost sight of an earlier, deeper, and polyvalent structural origin of the colonial project. I mean the very epochal moment of the founding of the idea of the Occidental polis in late Greek and especially (imperial) Roman antiquity. This was the moment that bore witness to the West’s self-conscious inscription of metaphysics—of thinking the transitory and singular (contingent or always incomplete) event from the exclusionary or accommodational providential/ panoptic vantage point of its (preconceived) “completion”—as the truth of being and history at large.34 As a consequence of this forgetting of the provenance of imperialism in the Roman transformation of the “errant” thinking of the Greeks into a “correct” (and, in Fukuyama’s term, “directional”) thinking, the discourse of postcolonialism has delimited its genealogy of Western imperialism to the Enlightenment and after and thus the ideological parameters of imperialism to the practice of empire, that is, to the site of cultural geopolitics. Despite its suggestive spontaneous probings beyond it (mostly in the form of its inadequately thought reiteration of the relay of “white” metaphors—center/periphery; light/darkness; plantation/wilderness; settler/nomad, development (improvement)/underdevelopment— that systematically informs the “truth” discourse of metaphysics), they therefore remain vestigially and ~~disablingly~~ [stultifyingly] disciplinary.

In other words, this privileged version of postcolonialist discourse is determined by a problematic that restricts itself to an idea of the imperial that remains indifferent to or, more accurately, overlooks the inaugural ontological ground on which the developing structure of the West as the West rests—a ground that, as I have shown, visibly reasserts itself in the neo-Hegelianism of the post-Cold War end-of-history discourse. As such, it is a critical discourse that addresses an imperialism that has been rendered anachronistic, if not exactly obsolete, by the triumphant culture’s representation of the end of the Cold War as the end of history and the annunciation of this “good news” as the advent of the New World Order. I mean, to retrieve and reconstellate into the present historical occasion the forgotten and decisively important ideological function of the ruse of the Pax Romana, the peace of what I have been calling the Pax Americana.

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event.

The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a ~~disabling~~ [stultifying] indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxis-oriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and ~~disabling~~ [stultifying]— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics:

The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of ~~blinding~~ [totalizing] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38

In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered ~~disablingly~~ [stultifyingly] invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

To be more specific, this reconstellated destructive genealogy will show that the reality of the “triumphant” American democratic/capitalist polity rests on a fabricated ontological base that privileges the hierarchically structured binarist principle of principles—that identity is the condition for the possibility of difference and not the other way around—and that, therefore, this polity is imperial in essence as well as in its multisituated political practices. It will show, in other words, that, in representing being meta ta physica (from after or above being’s temporal disseminations), this ontological base generates a “truth” discourse that, far from being transparently “objective,” open to the “empirical” event, is actually re-presentational, pan-optic, and retro-spective and, as such, utterly metaphorical— and ideological. To retrieve the now virtually forgotten, but extraordinarily resonant phrase Derrida coined to identify this truth discourse with European origins and interests, it will show that the alleged disinterested truth discourse of the West is, in fact, a binarist “white mythology.”40 It will show that its “truth” structuralizes or, more telling in the proximity of its sublimated metaphorics of temporal closure to the operations of colonization, spatializes or territorializes the differential dynamics of temporality around a polyvalent (Eurocentric) Logos. I mean by this Logos a Transcendental Signified or Principle of Presence invariably represented in Western history since the Romans’ codification of the domiciled colonus (“farmer”/“settler”) as the binary opposite of the nomadic sylvestris (“savage,” literally, “of the woods”) in the form of a combination of indissolubly related, hierarchically structured binary tropes of resolution or accommodation—most notably and enablingly, the centered circle, the panoptic eye (and its light), and, not least, the maturation process (the clearing of the wilderness and the planting and cultivation of the original seed). It is, for example, this relay of imperial tropes emanating from and circulating around the presiding Logos that informs Hegel’s imperial Philosophy of History, epitomized by the incantatory repetition of “World History”) in the following famous passage on “Enlightenment”:

The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning. The History of the World has an East kat’ exochen (the term East in itself is entirely relative), for although the Earth forms a sphere, History performs no circle round it, but has on the contrary a determinate East, viz., Asia. Here rises the outward physical Sun, and in the West it sinks down: here consentaneously rises the Sun of self-consciousness, which diffuses a nobler brilliance. The History of the World is the discipline of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience to a Universal principle and conferring subjective freedom.41

And, I will show in chapter 6, it is this relay of imperial tropes, subsumed to the Hegelian paradigm by Fukuyama, that has pervaded the unexceptionalist discourse of American exceptionalism from the Puritan jeremiad in behalf of the “errand in the wilderness,” through the discourse of the frontier in behalf of the fulfillment of America’s Manifest Destiny, to that of the post-9/11 effort to recuperate the American national identity in the wake of the Vietnam War.

More immediately, the reconstellation of destructive genealogy into the post-Cold War occasion will show that the relay of binarist “white” metaphors informing the truth discourse of the “triumphant” post- Enlightenment democratic/capitalist society constitutes a naturalized “diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form.”42 Contrary to the representation of the reigning disciplinary interpretation of being, this hegemonic diagram of power is operative simultaneously, however unevenly at any particular historical specific occasion, throughout the continuum of being, from the representation of being and the subject as such, through gender and race, to culture, economics, and the national and international polity. It is, in short, polyvalent in its imperial applications.

### Example #2

#### War and peace, left and right, have become indistinguishable. The *imperial actio*, a precept of Western ontological foundation, meaning the 1AC backdoors in an entire history of Western philosophy and metaphysics. The AFF’s alleged disorientation is deceptive outflanking that quashes the possibility of revolt. You should prefer a re-thinking of thinking to move away from their ontological reification of western notions of subjectivity.

Constantinou 12 [Marios, University of Cyprus, “Venus Imperatrix,” Parallax 18.4, p. 1-5]

What is under examination is Empire as an affective disclosure. What kind of world do imperial moods disclose? Being an affective intentionality without a subject, Empire discloses projects, involvements and logics of taking care of business which betray, as Michel Foucault has argued, a certain directionality of biopower whose overall effect escapes anyone’s intention in particular. Empire, then, is a state of mind, a fundamental mood; a mode of attunement where the biopower of the imperial bourgeoisie of the 19th century which served as a strategy of its self- constitution has by now evolved into a mood of global domination not only over collaborative elites aspiring to partnership but also over peoples. The thrilling mood of postmodern biopower, namely, the mood of ‘getting ready to be transfigured’ was captured for a moment by Helene Cixous: ‘who knows who I shall be, a moment from now, in the fertile night’ of Empire?5 Empire is the essential moodiness of Classical Imperialism, its clamorous self-duplicity disclosed anew in relative autonomy, so to speak, from its original models. Living through a gestation process at the heart of Central European Imperial metaphysics, Heidegger profoundly sensed both its disclosive and self-destructive moods. Although the moral assessment and juridical indictment of Nazism has more or less been orderly completed, Heidegger’s critical engagement with the neo-Roman foundations of Western imperialism remains, with rare exceptions, obscurely silenced.6 However there are still sufficient (and original) grounds for questioning these intellectual and affective tropes of Western imperialism. Heidegger anticipated that the inherently biopolitical moods of Empire would co-exist and co-evolve with imperialist terror; the existential withdrawal of a world that up until then was taken for granted as inert raw material, a mere standing reserve. Heidegger’s Being and Time, along with his lectures on Parmenides, are in many respects masterful investigations of the neo-Roman tropes of Empire. Heidegger remains, in my view, a forgotten but suggestive resource for a critical re-examination of the current dispositions of Empire as an indeterminable biopolitical terrain. Heidegger’s lesson, with regard to the present engagement, is relevant to the dual nature of imperial pacifism: humanistic and at the same time immanently related to war pathologies. Attuned to Heidegger’s critique, one could note that what is despicable is its ignoble, unconfessed and unconfessable violence which is philistine, cow hearted, lily-livered, weak-kneed and, at the same time, beastly, ferocious and relentless. Those who legitimize imperial peace commit the most contemptible form of violence, perpetrating the most cowardly assault. In Heidegger’s sense, they are the new arrivals of last men and women, evangelizing peace on imperial terms. If there is a critical legacy for thought after the fascist disaster that is it: the dual nature of the Empire of the last man and the unending completion of an American ivf metaphysics. Upon reflection, the moods of Empire disclose a fundamental ambiguity, particularly its manipulative, double-eyed biopolitical diplomacy. We are living through times when any reference to ‘imperialism’ sounds like the idle talk of a bygone era that memory cannot recall. We cannot but test the principal axioms of the New International Order against its master moods which neither disclose perpetual peace nor perpetual war but an ambiguous demarcation between the two, moving in and out of these states swiftly and without forewarning, hence trivializing both. In other words, there is still something fraudulently Roman about Empire – its commanding gaze, moods and disciplines – which confers upon any concept of politics an empty resonance. The Third Reich may be gone but the commanding logic of Roman interpellation as an imperial perspective is still our enduring condition. According to Heidegger, in Parmenides the defining feature of imperial actio proper alludes not to war but to the logic of fallere; of bringing down to fall by deceptive circumvention, by going around. In other words, commanding as a logic of imperial actio entails a constant surmounting, a deceptive outflanking, a circumspicio whose circular, periscopic, all encompassing revolving gaze turns the enemy’s resistance around.7 Ambiguity remains the privileged mood and disciplinary pedagogy of our imperial postmodernity. This mood in the sense of disposition ought then to be read in an extended Heideggerian sense which includes modes of disposing order and methods of pacification – that is, the biopolitical sovereignty of an uncircumscribed imperium consisting of formal commands, informal decrees and injunctions. The all-knowingness of ambiguous everyday structures of groundless hearsay or idle talk, spying or curiosity, furnishes the global biopower of Empire with average understandability, insatiably investigating and understanding everything, but learning nothing. This commonsensical ambiguity of ‘diaphanous’ publicity is the unsurpassable ontological structure of Empire as it stands. Its forces of simulation reduce any possibility of counteraction to an already belated, collateral and derivative status. So much for the ambiguous openness of Empire, Commonwealth and governance. We are all attuned into it! We rise and fall together! Heidegger’s insights into the structure of imperial command can be traced back to Nietzsche’s axiomatic style. Nietzsche’s account of affect as a hallmark of command schematizes genealogically the intriguing self-duplicity of biopower and its moodalities capable of de-powering resistance to it. The principal preoccupation of this intervention is to rethink the concept of Empire in terms of definable affects and effects: that is, by recollecting its luxurious yet bare will to biopower, the aimless striving of the will to will. Empire in this Nietzschean sense of decadence is both the commanding and obeying party – governing and opposing through NGOs, managing Right and Left and embodying contradictory drives and articulations of affect. Although Freud himself formally distinguished affect from the unconscious – ‘there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas’8 – and, thus, attributed consciousness to affective structures, affect still remains largely un-scrutinized within the current biopolitical problematic of Empire to the point of becoming almost unconscious. The concept of the will to biopower shifts the focus away from cathectic fixations on the unpolitical ideal of governance by selectively joining the modes of imperialism to the moods of Empire. If, then, the current state of post-Fordist Empire is not simply a farcical repetition of the tragedy of imperialism, it is therefore necessary to address a convulsive question which points beyond mystifying speculations on the ‘multitude’ to (perhaps) more intriguing figures such as its new courtiers, conspirators and agents. What kind of moodalities pave the way to the new imperial scene? What kind of professions are performing the ‘double jobs’ of the secret agent and the intellectual, the private detective and the police prefect, the academic vagabond and the conspirator, the politician and the playboy, the courtier and the courier of Empire? How is the current Empire performed? The post-Fordist recalibration of affect entails some stealthy dualities as well as spectacular couplings which conjoin the wealth-affect to the wealth-effect. Lyotard has to be credited, of course, for anticipating this problematic of biopolitical intelligence and biocratic opportunism: And if there is a crisis of political economy, it is primarily (but not only, as we shall see) because in this process of incessant integration which gives rise to the movement of expansion, the said ‘science’ of course loses its Latin but first its object: for what is ‘wealth’, what is ‘good’, what is ‘exchange’, what is labour, when salary obviously contains surplus-value [ . . . ] when speech, knowledge, opinion, aptitude can and must be accounted for in assets, when the decision to invest in capital no longer necessarily belongs to its owners, when the military man becomes an economist, the economist a psychoanalyst, the scientist a military man, the pedagogue an information scientist?9 Here Lyotard redeems Heidegger’s controversial but profound axiom of Being and Time: ‘they are what they do’! The Heideggerian question of our times is precisely the interchangeability of imperial professions: the irreversible process by which Da-sein, as a biopolitical self, is manifested through the new ‘private occupations’ of Empire which constitute the predominant structure of the ‘they’. Empire, in Heidegger’s terms, is a geopolitical fursorge, a caring for, a pastoral caritas. It takes the care of the other by way of a geopolitical welfare work, thus anticipating Foucault’s seminal analysis of pastoral power. This business of imperial solicitude leaps in the place of colonies and postcolonial protectorates. The domain of biopolitical professions privatizes imperial concern by rendering imperialist domination tacit, impersonal, hidden: ‘The other is thus displaced, he steps back, so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can take it over as something finished and available, or disburdern himself completely.’10 Taking care of imperial business literally entails an incapacitation. Latin, as an imperial language, captures this sense as incapistro (to quieten, to fetter, to pacify, to tranquilize, to ensnare and bind the capacity for self-rule and self- determination). It even occasions the ‘disburderning’ of subject populations from the weighty task of sovereignty: In this concern, the other can become one who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. This kind of concern which does the job and takes away ‘care’ is, to a large extent, determinative for being with one another and pertains, for the most part, to our taking care of things at hand. In contrast to this, there is the possibility of a concern which does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him, not in order to take ‘care’ away from him, but to first give it back to him as such.11 What figures between the two poles of the ontological structure of Da-sein is an imperial spectrum of mixed modes of hidden and unhidden command which duplicate the two extremes in complementary experiments of solicitude. Isn’t this relentless opportunism of incessant reduplication what is missing from Hardt and Negri’s biopolitical economy of affective labour? Simulated intelligence is unavoidably the form taken by the post-Fordist virtualization of biopower. It is in these terms that it appears impossible to distinguish between secret and overt intelligence, oiled academics and lumpen bohemians, war and peace, neo-liberalism and socialism, the communism of capital and the communism of the multitude, Right and Left, Empire and Imperialism, biopower and biopolitics. This new age of gilded Imperialism can only be realized in terms of a biopolitical osmosis which Paul Virilio depicts as a state of impossible distinction between ‘economic war and information war, since each involves the same hegemonic ambition of making commercial and military exchanges interactive.’12 What we are currently faced with is, indeed, an interactive opportunism of the new occupations of Empire. This vanity of spurious and ineffective duplications is what precisely defines the biopolitical outlook of the new civic nomenclature of Empire. Nonetheless, the interactive neocorporatism characterizing the new occupations of Empire comes into being through layers of what may be called cumulative imperialism. The global casino capitalism of debt pyramids, financial bubbles, Popperian open societies and Hayekian free markets evangelized by the billionaire arch-cynic and exemplary non-state agent George Soros is embedded in patterns, thresholds, scales and disciplinary programs of transnational biopolitical conditioning which, however, resonate with an intensive geopolitical morphogenesis. The latter increasingly bears the characteristics of what Virilio calls biocracy – for example, re-Balkanization or re-Sicilianization.13

#### They are just wrong. The 1ac was nothing, we are nothing, you are nothing—vote negative to let it be

**Thacker 15.** Eugene, an author and Professor at The New School. *Starry Speculative Corpse: Horror of Philosophy*. 75-79

“First definition: the nothing of finite creatures. Creatures are “nothing” in the sense that they are created in time, and as time. Phenomenally, creatures exist in the world as flux and flow, as coming-to-be and passing-away (to borrow Aristotle’s terms). This nothing is, as we’ve noted, the moral-theological notion, the devaluation of life and being, the “flight from creatures” advocated by theological orthodoxy. Nothing in this sense is privative. Second definition: the nothing of creaturely being. Creatures are created in order to be (as Eckhart notes, “He created all things that they may be”). Thus there is a prior non-being that both precedes the creature and is its philosophical ground. Creatures are “nothing” in that they are founded on a primordial, pre-existent, non-being. Nothing in this sense is subtractive. Third definition: the nothing of God. God is that which is outside of time, space, and modality. God is “nothing” in so far as God is not a being among other beings. But neither is God simply the supreme being or the most perfect being. God is, in this context, the Being of all beings, the superlative being whose particular, conditioning form of being bears little relation to the conditioned status of creaturely beings. Nothing in this sense is superlative. Fourth definition: the nothing of the Godhead. Eckhart’s own brand of apophaticism frequently puts him in a situation in which God alone is insufficient. There is, “beyond” God, the Godhead, to which no attributes, properties, or names can be given. Importantly, for Eckhart the metaphysics of being does not pertain to the Godhead. Eckhart often describes the God “head as “the One.” The Godhead, as the One, bears no relation to Being, or to Non-Being. In one sermon Eckhart asserts, “God is all, and is one.”103 Elsewhere he notes that the Godhead is “a non-God, a non-spirit, a non-person, a non-image; rather, He is a sheer pure limpid One, detached from all duality.”104 Here we can put forth a “heretical” reading of Eckhart. In this final sense of nothing, the nothing of finite creatures (first definition) is simply a pretext for the real identity or indistinction of the nothing of creaturely being (second definition) and the empty God (third definition). All of this is what is encompassed in the Eckhartian notion of nothing, in this final sense. The nothing of the now, the nothing of all that is. Nothing in this final sense is nullifying. In traditional accounts of Christian mysticism, one is led to a dilemma, a fork in the road between two types of divine mediation: either that of there being no relation to the divine, or that of there being a relation to the divine, as nothing. With Eckhart, we see that this is a false dilemma - but one must abrogate some of the most basic principles of philosophical and theological thinking to reach this point. In our heretical reading of Eckhart, divine mediation has little to do with a negative that must be overcome by a positive. Instead, divine mediation is the collapse of negative and positive, subtractive and superlative, into the strange negative immanence, an immanence of nothing that Eckhart terms the Godhead. The Godhead: nothing is everywhere. Furthermore, for Eckhart this mediation leads not to despair, but is “joyful.” But Eckhart, too, runs into problems. For one, any careful reading of Eckhart must acknowledge that this talk about God as “nothing, the immanent Godhead, and the arid, empty, unhuman desert is always doubled by an equal commitment to the Trinity, the kenosis or self-emptying of Christ, and a Person-oriented mysticism of Father, Son, and Human.105 Put simply, the “philosophical” Eckhart is always correlated to the “theological” Eckhart. Both are, perhaps, brought into an uneasy relation, and it is this assemblage that constitutes the “mystical” Eckhart. Eckhart at once shores up the limits of the human while at the same time asserting a profound commitment to the human – but a human that is also a “letting-be,” a human that is a “living without a why.” “This tension is illustrated in Eckhart’s different uses of the term “nothing.” On the one hand, there is the nothing of creaturely life, the non-substantiality of what is ephemeral and temporary, the nothing of the all-too-human in its creaturely finitude. On the other hand, there is the nothing of the Godhead, the nothing that superlatively encompasses everything, including the very dichotomy of something/nothing, being/non-being. This is the nothing that is at once transcendent and immanent, the nothing that is at once the apophatic inaccessibility of the divine and the very ground of all that is, as it is. These resolve in a kind of dual-annihilation that is not simply negation. Bernard McGinn provides a summary:” “To say that creatures are nothing for Eckhart is to say that the existence they possess is a pure receiving. Poised between two forms of nothingness, the nihil by way of eminence that is God, and the nihil that marks the defect of creatures, Eckhart’s mystical way will be an invitation to the soul to give up the nothingness of its created self in order to become the divine Nothing that is also all things.106 While we have outlined four usages of the term “nothing” in Eckhart, we could have also streamlined them into two, into a basic distinction between the nothing of creatures (of the human, of creaturely mediation) and the nothing of God (of the unhuman, of divine mediation). But even this division ultimately breaks down in Eckhart. The nothing of creatures immediately opens onto the nothing of the Godhead, collapsing the division into what Eckhart describes as the nothing of that which is, the nothing of “letting be.” So, while our strong reading of Eckhart pushes for total indistinction and the paradoxical immanence of nothing, we must also note that, even in his most heretical moments, Eckhart still preserves a basic distinction between two types of nothing.

#### The collapse onto strategic essentialism simply creates a new simulacra of “China” to be consumed by the Western techno-public

Gupta ‘15 /Indrani Das, M.Phil English Jamia Millia Islamia University, Hyper reality and Identity in a Postcolonial World, International Journal of Research, Vol. 2 Iss. 3, http://www.internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/ijr/article/view/1735/1632/

In the postcolonial contexts particularly, the distinctiveness of identity is predicated upon notion of space, “located elsewhere”. However, people who inhabit the peripheries, what Anzaldua called the “narrow strip along steep edges” (Gupta and Ferguson 7), forces us to rethink the identity/difference dichotomization. The structuring polarization between identity as positive and difference as negative needs to be questioned, and the need of the hour is to move along the lines of differences structured in accordance with the “precession of the model” to rethink the subjectivities configured in accordance with a logic of simulation (McCarthy xiii). With the places and localities becoming blurred and indeterminate in the implosion of the simulation of reference, Baudrillard’s fourth ‘fractal’ order, the erasure of all differences, has led to a renewed interest in the culturally and ethnic distinctions. Simulacra and hyperreality allows for a re-examination of the Postcolonial subject under question as well as problematize the production and dissemination of knowledge in relation to identity and cultural difference. In the hyperreal mode, the representation or image, no longer denotes the referent, as the sign has itself become the real. “The territory no longer precedes the map, but rather the map precedes the territory. The image bears no relation to reality, it is its own simulation” (Baudrillard 11). Hyperreality facilitates an interrogation of the ‘real’ in both colonialist and anti-colonialist discourses making us aware of Kristeva’s “writing as experience-limits” (Hutcheon 8). If identity established in these discourses is “no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody”, but “a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real” (Baudrillard 2), one could read that “colonialism and neo-imperialism are functions of a broader Western civilizational strategy of obfuscating the hidden absence of the ‘real’ by simulating reality as normative” ( qtd. in McCarthy ix). As William Merrin signals, Baudrillard’s work can be understood most fruitfully as occupying a space between historicity and philosophy. As an ideological site for the negotiation of postcoloniality, hyperreality allows postcolonial subjects to move beyond merely identifying with the past (with a retrograde voyeurism) to a deconstructive identification with unfixable and positional identities within the simulacrum (qtd. in McCarthy xx). Now, with the “whole edifice of representation, being a simulation” (Baudrillard 11), one needs to ask in the words of Clifford, “what processes rather than essences are involved in the present experience of cultural identity” (qtd. in Gupta and Ferguson 14). Hyperreality critiques “the imperialist and colonialist notions of purity as much as it question[s] the nationalist notions” (Bhabha 64). Baudrillard’s views on simulacra and hyperreality shifts the ground considerably, in its insistence to question what is at stake on the importance of “irreducible difference” (Grace 89). This ‘strategic essentialisms’ to use Spivak’s term, obfuscates the situatedness, locatedness which cannot be subsumed within the all-pervasive notions of identity based on oppositional binaries. Hyperreality tends to highlight the limitations of an identity based on the fragmented space of ‘imagined communities’ of a modern state. And the rapid advances in technology and the processes of globalization which have resulted in new configurations of margins and peripheries marked by migrations and the diasporic community, what is termed by Gupta and Ferguson, as ‘the transnational public sphere’ meaning that the fiction of the postcolonial nation- state, whose boundaries enclose cultures and regulate cultural exchange can no longer be sustained. Baudrillard’s description of consumptive society inundated with simulated images “offers a ‘paradoxical space” for the agency of the subject, facilitating both creative potential and selfdefining possibilities being also subjected identities to the law of the market. The “reversibility” implied in the “images preceding the real” is particularly important in terms of the debates around identity predicted on difference as it eventually shows the fictionality of all discourses about identity and cultural differences exemplifying the change implicit in “collective memory and orientation” (Rojek 115). Conclusion The world of Baudrillard cannot be said to be devoid of agency, or nihilistic as one is continuously aware of being a part of simulations, a world of consumption, which allows for “the radical operation of the interrogating the ‘otherness’ of the other” (Gupta and Ferguson 16). To conclude, hyperreality critiques the identity realized on what Arjun Appadurai has termed the “spatial incarceration of the native”, and allows for a rethinking of the relations between “culture, power, and space” (Gupta and Ferguson 17). ). Moreover, through the myriad images/signs which constitute our culture, our identity is constantly renewed and expanded with the “signs being appropriated, translated, rehistoricised and read anew” (Bhabha 37).

### Example #3

#### Focusing on violence “over there” masks violence “over here.”

Corntassel 14 (J. Corntassel, 2014; Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014, pp. 1-32- Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations. Corey Snelgrove, University of British Columbia - Rita Kaur Dhamoon, University of Victoria - Jeff Corntassel, University of Victoria)

Jeff: And I think, the more you can make those links, the British occupation of Maori territory is directly related to HBC’s strategy to begin treaty making here… All those things are interrelated. They are shared, and they are seen as shared strategies. The other thing I see is this impulse to delocalize it… it’s always that kind of Free Tibet Syndrome… the further away acts of genocide are from your location, the more outrage expressed at these injustices. It’s a way of avoiding complicity, but it’s also a way of recasting the gaze. It’s like, ‘We’re not going to look right here, because this appears to be fairly peaceful’ And so it’s always that sort of re-directing away from localized responsibility, and almost magnifying impacts farther away.

#### The Aff’s rhetorical commitment to narrow and immediate action is the problem. The target must be far broader or else failure and violence are a certainty.

Herod 01 [James, anarchist theorist and activist, <http://www.jamesherod.info/>] JTC

I spent several years in the early sixties studying Underdevelopment. It was frustrating, in that none of the theories I examined really seemed to explain the phenomenon. That is, the Theories of Development that were prevalent then (only in mainstream discourse, I later learned) didn't really answer the question: Why are some countries poor? I would look at US Aid programs, only to conclude that they didn't work, that they didn't help countries develop, and often got in the way. My response at that time was to argue, and to try to call to the attention of US Aid administrators, that the programs weren't working, and were not achieving the results they were supposed to. The programs were not facilitating development and economic growth in the countries they were supposed to be benefiting. Fortunately for me, with the explosion and re-emergence of radical consciousness in late sixties, I was able to overcome this naiveté. Unfortunately though, for much of the American Left (especially for its so-called progressive wing), this naiveté, this bad habit of not seeing the enemy, this tendency to think that the US government's policies and actions are just mistakes, this seemingly ineradicable belief that the US government means well, is the most common outlook. It was certainly the majoritarian belief among those who opposed the Vietnam War. I helped write a broad sheet once, which we distributed at a big anti-war demonstration in Washington DC in November 1969, and which was titled "Vietnam is a Stake not a Mistake". In this document we spelled out the imperial reasons which explained why the government was waging war, quite deliberately and rationally, against Vietnam. In subsequent decades there has been no end to the commentators who take the 'this is a mistake' line. Throughout the low intensity (i.e., terrorist) wars against Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1980s we heard this complaint again and again. It is currently seen in the constant stream of commentaries on the US assault on Colombia. It has been heard repeatedly during the past two years in the demonstrations against the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. Protesters complain that the WTO's policies of structural adjustment are having the opposite effect of what they're suppose to. That is, they are hindering, not facilitating, development, and causing poverty, not alleviating it. Two years ago, in 1999, throughout the 78 day bombing attack on Yugoslavia, much of the outpouring of progressive commentary on the event (that which didn't actually endorse the bombing that is) argued that "this is a mistake".[1] My favorite quote from that episode, was from Robert Hayden, Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, being interviewed by Amy Goodman on Democracy Now, April 19, 1999. He said: "But we have the Clinton administration that developed a diplomacy that seems to have been intended to have produced this war, and now the Clinton administration's actions seem determined to produce a wider war." Amy Goodman: "Why would the Clinton Administration want to produce a war?" Hayden: "Boy, you know what? You've got me there. And as I say, you have to go back to the simple principles of incompetence. Never assume competence on the part of these guys." This was surely the bottom of the pit for the 'this is a mistake' crowd. I could cite quotes like this by the dozen, but instead let me turn to our current "war". So what has been the response of the 'progressive community' to the bombing of Afghanistan? As usual, they just don't get it. They just can't seem to grasp the simple fact that the government does this stuff on purpose. Endlessly, progressives talk as if the government is just making a mistake, does not see the real consequences of its actions, or is acting irrationally, and they hope to correct the government's course by pointing out the errors of its ways. Progressives assume that their goals -- peace, justice, well-being -- are also the government's goals. So when they look at what the government is doing, they get alarmed and puzzled, because it is obvious that the government's actions are not achieving these goals. So they cry out: "Hey, this policy doesn't lead to peace!" or "Hey, this policy doesn't achieve justice (or democracy, or development)!" By pointing this out, they hope to educate the government, to help it to see its mistakes, to convince it that its policies are not having the desired results.[2] How can they not see that the US government acts deliberately, and that it knows what it is doing? How can they not see that the government's goals are not peace and justice, but empire and profit. It wants these wars, this repression. These policies are not mistakes; they are not irrational; they are not based on a failure of moral insight (since morality is not even a factor in their considerations); they are not aberrations; they are not based on a failure to analyze the situation correctly; they are not based on ignorance. This repression, these bombings, wars, massacres, assassinations, and covert actions are the coldly calculated, rational, consistent, intelligent, and informed actions of a ruling class determined at all costs to keep its power and wealth and preserve its way of life (capitalism). It has demonstrated great historical presence, persistence, and continuity in pursuing this objective. This ruling class knows that it is committing atrocities, knows that it is destroying democracy, hope, welfare, peace, and justice, knows that it is murdering, massacring, slaughtering, poisoning, torturing, lying, stealing, and it doesn't care. Yet most progressives seem to believe that if only they point out often enough and loud enough that the ruling class is murdering people, that it will wake up, take notice, apologize, and stop doing it. Here is a typical expression of this naiveté (written by an author, Brian Willson, who was in the process of introducing a list of US interventions abroad!): "Many of us are continually disturbed and grief stricken because it seems that our U.S. government does not yet understand: (a) the historical social, cultural, and economic issues that underlay most of the political and ecological problems of the world; (b) the need to comply with, as legally agreed to, rather than continually defy, international law and international institutions established for addressing conflict; and (c) that military solutions, including production, sale, and use of the latest in technological weapons, are simply ill-equipped and wrong-headed for solving fundamental social and economic problems." [3] He is wrong on all three counts. (a) The US government has an intimate, detailed knowledge of the social, cultural, and economic characteristics of every country it intervenes in. It is especially familiar with the ethnic, linguistic, political, and religious divisions within the country. It is not interested in how these issues "underlay most of the political and ecological problems of the world", since it is not interested in those problems, certainly not in solving them, since it is the main creator of those problems. Rather, it uses its expert knowledge to manipulate events within the country in order to advance its own goals, profit and empire. (b) The US government understands perfectly that it expressly needs not to comply with international law in order to maintain its ability to act unilaterally, unfettered by any constraints, to advance its imperial aims. The claim that the US defies international law because of a misunderstanding is absurd. (c) Who says that the US government is trying to solve "fundamental social and economic problems"? These are not its aims at all. The objectives that it does pursue, consciously and relentlessly, namely profit and empire, are in fact the causes of these very "social and economic problems". Furthermore, for its true aims, military solutions, far from being "ill-equipped and wrong-headed", work exceptionally well. Military might sustains the empire. Arming every little client regime of the international ruling class with 'the latest in technological weapons" is necessary, and quite effective, in maintaining the repressive apparatus needed to defend empire, in addition to raking in lots of profit for the arms manufacturers. But evidently Mr. Willson "does not yet understand" any of these things. Let's take another example. Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, otherwise very sensible writers, complain that "bombing a desperately poor country under the yoke of a repressive regime is a wrongheaded response [to the "unspeakable acts of violence" committed on Sept. 11]. "The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan should cease immediately," they say. They discuss three reasons: "1. The policy of bombing increases the risk of further terrorism against the United States. 2. The bombing is intensifying a humanitarian nightmare in Afghanistan. 3. There are better ways to seek justice." All three statements are true of course, but irrelevant, because seeking justice, avoiding humanitarian nightmares, and reducing the risk of terrorism do not enter into the calculations of US policy makers. Quite the contrary, US policy makers create injustice, humanitarian nightmares, and terrorism, throughout the world, in pursuit of the imperial objective of making profit, and this has been thoroughly documented in thousands of scholarly studies. So for Mokhiber and Weissman to talk in this way, and phrase the problem in this way, exposes their failure to really comprehend the enemy we face, which in turn prevents them from looking for effective strategies to defeat that enemy, like so many other opponents of the "war". Hence all the moralizing, the bulk of which is definitely directed at the rulers, not at the ruled. That is, it is not an attempt to win over the ruled, but an attempt to win over the rulers. [4] It's what I call the "we should" crowd -- all those people who hope to have a voice in the formation of policy, people whose stances are basically that of consultants to the ruling class. "We" should do this, "we" shouldn't do that, as if they had anything at all to say about what our rulers do. This is the normal stance among the bootlicking intelligentsia of course. But what is it doing among progressives and radicals? Even if their stance is seen to be not exactly that of consultants, but that of citizens making demands upon their government, what makes them think that the government ever listens? I think this attitude -- the "we should" attitude -- is rooted in part at least in the fact that most progressives still believe in nations and governments. They believe that this is "our" country, and that this is "our" government, or at least should be. So Kevin Danaher says that "we should get control of the government." They identify themselves as Americans, or Germans, or Mexicans, or Swedes. So they are constantly advising and making demands that 'their' government should do this and that. If they would reject nationalism altogether, and states and governments, they could begin to see another way. A variation of the 'this is a mistake' theme has appeared in commentaries on the present "war", on Afghanistan. Progressives argue that the US is "falling into a trap". They argue that Osama bin Laden had hoped to provoke the US into doing just what it is doing, attacking Afghanistan. In their view, the US government is being stupid, acting blindly, responding irrationally, and showing incompetence. That is, it is "making a mistake". It never seems to occur to these analysts that the government may actually be awake, even alert, or that it jumped at the opportunity offered it by the attacks of September Eleven to do what it had wanted to do anyway -- seize Afghanistan, build a big new base in Uzbekistan, declare unending war on the enemies of Empire everywhere, and initiate draconian repression against internal dissent in order to achieve "domestic tranquility". I saw yet another variation on the theme just recently. John Tirman writes about "Unintended Consequences".[5] He thinks that "No matter how cautious generals and political leaders are ... unseen and unintended [results] occur, at times as a bitter riptide which overwhelms the original rationales for engaging in armed combat. This unpredictable cycle of action and reaction has thwarted U.S. policy in southwest Asia for 50 years." It's the usual mistake: Tirman imputes policies to the US government which it does not have. US policy has not been thwarted, it has been highly successful. The US has succeeded in keeping control of Middle Eastern oil for the past half century. This is what it wanted to do, and this is what it did. Tirman however reviews the history of US intervention in the Middle East, beginning with the overthrow of Mossedegh in Iran in 1953, and sees it as one long blunder, nothing but bumbling incompetence, complicated further by 'unintended consequences' which thwart the goals of American foreign policy. He seems to think that the US was (or "should be") trying to reduce US dependence on Middle Eastern oil, fighting Islamic fundamentalism, reducing human suffering, assisting in economic development, promoting democracy,X and so on -- anything and everything except what it is actually doing, keeping control of Middle Eastern oil, and using any means necessary to do so. Tirman is aware of course that this (oil) is the true aim of US policy, because he quotes directly from US officials who state this objective explicitly, but somehow this doesn't sink in. Instead, he finally asks in exasperation: "What will be next in this series of haunting mistakes?"Ariel Dorfman, author of a creative critique of US imperialism, in the form of How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic, was being interviewed on Democracy Now by Amy Goodman, on October 25, 2001, about the assassination of Digna Ochoa, the leading civil rights lawyer in Mexico. When asked by Goodman to put the murder in the larger context of what was happening in the world, like in Afghanistan, Dorfman replied: "Because the US is in Afghanistan and it needs all its allies behind it, they are going to turn a blind eye to all the abuses of authority that are happening." Pardon me? A blind eye? Isn't the US government in the business, with both eyes open, of murdering labor leaders, leftists, progressives, and civil rights activists all over the world? Dorfman went on to say that now would be "a good moment that President Bush could call his friend Vicente Fox and say: 'I want the murderers of Digna Ochoa put on trial'." Excuse me! Is he kidding? It's quite probable that Bush did call Fox, but with a rather different message, namely, to tell him that while the world's attention was focused on Afghanistan, now would be a good time to kill Digna Ochoa y Placido. An Afghani man from Kabul escaped into Pakistan carrying a packet of letters addressed to the world's leaders, "handwritten messages from his panic-stricken community." "The world must know what is happening in Afghanistan," said Mohammed Sardar, 46, his voice ragged with anxiety and anger. "The terrorists and the leaders are still free, but the people are dying and there is no one to listen to us. I must get to President Bush and the others and tell them they are making a terrible mistake." [6]    The widespread belief that the US government has good intentions, a belief held onto tenaciously in spite of decades of overwhelming empirical evidence refuting it, has got to be one of the greatest phenomena of mass delusion in history. It would take a twenty-first century Freud to unravel this one. Here is a government that has already bombed two other countries to smithereens just in the past ten years, first Iraq and then Yugoslavia (not to mention endless interventions abroad since its inception [7]). Now it is bombing Afghanistan to smithereens -- hospitals, fuel supplies, food depots, electrical systems, water systems, radio stations, telephone exchanges, remote villages, mosques, old folks homes, UN offices, Red Cross warehouses, clinics, schools, neighborhoods, roads, dams, airports -- and a victim of the assault escapes to plead for help from the very people who are attacking him. To have created such an illusion as this is surely one of the greatest feats of propaganda ever seen.[8]

#### Focusing on mere survivability renders people of color’s lives valueless, only the alt solves.

Omolade 84 [Barbara Omolade, who works with the City College Center for Worker Education in New York City, has been a historian of black women for the past twenty years and an organizer in both the women's and civil rights/black power movements. “Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust” Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, Teaching about Peace, War, and Women in the Military (Summer, 1984), p. 12]

Nuclear arsenals and nuclear power are part of a rational and holistic system in which those in power hold power over all aspects of world society. It is irrelevant whether they are called "mad" or "sane" by protestors and critics of the system. The fact remains that they are men, initiating and carrying out the dictates of a rational system of military terror. Calling them "mad," or considering them military "male chauvinists," assures only that the rational system they are part of will remain obscure, and that the responsibility of each man in the Pentagon will never be understood clearly enough to wage an effective political struggle against it. Nuclear disarmament and peace are political questions requiring political solutions of accountability and struggle around who has the power to deter-mine the destiny of the earth. The demand for unconditional U.S. disarmament holds that the U.S. government is responsible for its actions and should be held accountable for them. To raise these issues effectively, the movement for nuclear dis-armament must overcome its reluctance to speak in terms of power, of institutional racism, and imperialist military terror. The issues of nuclear disarmament and peace have been mystified because they have been placed within a doomsday frame which separates these issues from other ones, saying, "How can we talk about struggles against racism, poverty, and exploitation when there will be no world after they drop the bombs?" The struggle for peace cannot be separated from, nor considered more sacrosanct than, other struggles concerned with human life and change. In April, 1979, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World. The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war, as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages. Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation's crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people. And the housing of people of color throughout the world's urban areas is already blighted and inhumane: families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets; even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago. Our world, with its own languages, customs and ways, ended. And we are only now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for it, and rebuld it in our, own image. The "death culture" we live in has convinced many to be more concerned with death than with life, more willing to demonstrate for "survival at any cost" than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity. Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered. Acts of war, nu-clear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands. As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists. We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people's wars in China, in Cuba, in Guinea- Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and in countless daily encounters with land-lords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but the only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people. We wonder who will lead the battle for nuclear disarmament with the vigor and clarity that women of color have learned from par-ticipating in other struggles. Who will make the political links among racism, sexism, imperialism, cultural integrity, and nuclear arsenals and housing? Who will stand up?